Dreyfus's complaint is with a conception of mind and mindedness that he originally called "the Myth of the Mental," but has since rebranded "the Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental" (see Dreyfus 2005a Dreyfus & 2013 , in order to indicate that he does not reject mindedness, per se, but the priority of mindedness, conceptuality, or mentalism in accounts of intentional action. McDowell, in his turn, agrees with Dreyfus that the Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental is to be rejected. The twinned ideas that, "if mindedness informs an experience, the subject has a detached contemplative relation to the world she experiences, and that if mindedness informs an action, the agent has a detached monitoring relation to what she is doing" have little purchase (McDowell 2013, 41) . However, presupposing mind-detachment as basic is not what McDowell means by claiming "that mindedness is pervasive. [...] We should not pretend to find a detached self in all our experiencing and acting" (ibid.). This, McDowell claims, is not the Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental, but "the Myth of Mind as Detached" (ibid.). Pervasive "conceptuality" as McDowell understands it does not entail mind-detachment, but it does guard against the reductive naturalism that runs alongside the Myth of the Given, which "we can avoid," writes McDowell, "if we hold that in the experiencing itself, capacities that belong to their subject's rationality are in play" (ibid., 42).
Take colour-recognition. No matter how large a person's colour vocabulary, her bodily sensitivity to chromatic differences, all things being equal, outstrips her linguistic ability to name them. Nevertheless, being unable to affix a unique name to a particular shade-occurrence is not an instance of non-conceptual experience, for our always-already operative concepts of colour and shade allow for such situation-specific demonstrative utterances as: (i) "that shade of x"; (ii) "this, rather than that, shade of x"; or (iii) "that … is the same shade of x as … ." 1 This alone, however, does not mark pervasive conceptuality. What ensures that experiences encapsulated by such and similar demonstrative utterances are indeed conceptual "is that the associated capacity [for recognition] can persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be used also in thoughts about what is by then past, if only the recent past" (see [iii] ). 2 So conceptuality is not, for McDowell, mind-detachment, a matter of adopting a putatively third-person orientation to one's own first-person Being-in-the-world. The critical distance that Dreyfus takes to indicate this stance in McDowell is actually an experientialtemporal distance (see McDowell 2013, 43-45) , the duration only by which conceptuality gets a grip: our essentially temporal ways of being -including life lived fluidly or "in flow" 3 -can only be disclosed significantly thanks to our conceptual capacities.
Having defined conceptuality in these terms, McDowell claims that Dreyfus has yet to explain why engaged, non-reflective rationality cannot be operative all ways throughpervasively, one might say -human-Being and agency; he has not explained why fluid coping and conceptuality must be mutually exclusive (McDowell 2013, 54) . Fair comment, this, for where fluid coping results from practiced repetition, 4 McDowellian conceptuality is surely involved: without it, repeated actions would count only as reflex motions and twitches. §3: The Background While McDowellian conceptuality saves a space for TK defined as "context-dependent, conceptually structured, practical knowledge," Gascoigne and Thornton bring to the McDowellian mix an emphasis on practical ability or know-how. But just as Dreyfus fails to show why pervasive conceptuality cannot accommodate or be accommodated by fluid coping, neither does Gascoigne and Thornton's siding with McDowell clearly nullify the existentialphenomenological Background.
As Dreyfus notes, Background has no fixed term in Heidegger other than Dasein's basic Being-in-the-world (1993, 90) . This being the case, "worldhood" is in many ways preferable to "Background," as it avoids both the sense of obnubilation to which Gascoigne and Thornton object, and the propositional hypostatization of practical knowledge (see §6). If Being-in-theworld "amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in [the] references or assignments" by which the stuff of our routine involvements become significant (Heidegger 1962, 107) , then "worldhood" is a mode of Being by which this or that world (of a Dasein) is disclosed as such. "Worldhood" just is the way Dasein orients itself towards and within its world, and by which Dasein's world emerges, or is disclosed, as significant (see ibid., 92).
McDowell assumes that the always-already-known and always-already-articulable are correlative of the "distinctive self-knowledge of an agent," which consists not only in "knowledge of what she is doing, but also knowledge of why she is doing it." It "does not matter" that answering the What? and Why? questions "will break the flow" of initial activity; what is important is that answering these questions, which, in normal circumstances an agent always can, "gives expression to something [an agent] already knew when she was acting in flow" (2013, 47) . This is similar to Heidegger's formulation of Dasein as a locus constituted by and constitutive of always-already familiar involvements (see Heidegger 1962, 107) ; or, in other words -and just as Dasein as Being-in-the-world is always-already familiar with its own Beingthe familiarity that McDowell presupposes is rather like what Heidegger calls the "worldhood" of a Dasein's world.
Plainly, in neither McDowellian mindedness nor Heideggerian disclosure is a "having-inmind" necessary. My fluid comportments within, towards, and by dint of the worldhood of my world just are their significances; they signify involvements constituting my environing contexture. 5 Entering a room by way of the door thanks to functional command of doorways, doors and door-handles is significant of my fluid coping vis-à-vis doorways, doors, and doorhandles: it is only because such involvements necessitate conceptuality that we can cope as we do; only because conceptuality pervades that disruptions in our coping-streams show up as disruptions in this or that engagement. McDowell writes that "making the content in question explicit -even if the subject first has to acquire the means to do that -does not make the content newly conceptual [...] . It was conceptual already" (McDowell 2013, 43) . Recall, too, McDowell's point about breaks in flow indicating, not countering, presumption of the alwaysalready-known. Heidegger writes that the model transition by which objectual involvements go from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand "is thrust to the fore by the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection" -our fluid engagements with our contexture -"'operates'" (Heidegger 1962, 107 ). In Heideggerian terms, then, McDowell's assumption of the always-already-conceptual nature of day-to-day comportment grounds the possibility of the (normally) ready-to-hand showing up as present-at-hand in the moment of blockage or disruption. Were a door-handle unexpectedly not to function, as one attempted to make one's way into a room, one's normal fluid coping would be disrupted momentarily, but in a manner that is conceptually significant -not anew, but still -and shaped in relation to the otherwise always-already familiar contexture.
Gascoigne and Thornton, then, are right when they say that nothing in principle is hidden from view, but this is beside the point: it is the always-already-familiarity of Beingwhich is not "behind" knowledge, as the "Background" metaphor suggests, but in it -that is at stake in worldhood and conceptuality. Perhaps the visual metaphor is a little misleading: the fact that something is not hidden does not mean we are looking at or for it, nor that we are bound to mark it. To the extent that TK in Gascoigne and Thornton is contextually constrained, they presuppose Background-as-worldhood precisely because they endorse McDowellian conceptuality: what they are calling "context" is surely something rather like worldhood as I have outlined it, and which, I have tried to show, is also operative in McDowell. Just as McDowell believes Dreyfus's objections to be correct but founded on a misreading, such is the case with Gasciogne and Thornton's reading of Background-as-worldhood. Worldhood is not that which hangs vaporously behind us, out of view; it is bound up in the very possibility of conceptuality and is a precondition for knowledge, as we will now see. §4: Embodiment, Conceptuality, and Propositionality If, rather than obviating it, Gascoigne and Thornton seem to require worldhood, then one reason for this is in mistakenly seeing McDowell as opposed to, rather than corrective of, Dreyfus. Another is in conceiving TK as being "articulated from 'within'." This takes it for granted that knowledge, per se, being conceptual and person-al, must be "in" the mind, in the way that thoughts are said to be "in" one's head. The train of thought, roughly, is: because TK is personalpractical know-how, where a person has knowledge it must be of something and held "in" the mind. Knowledge is tacit when it cannot be "brought out" separately from an appropriate context. On this view, though, knowledge appears to sit dormant, as it were, "in" the mind until one is in a situation appropriate for its arousal and expression.
One of the problems with the location of knowledge is a result of the preposition "in" being made to perform a double-duty: to say that worldhood is articulated in our bodily engagements with the world is to make "in" mean "by," "through," "as," even "between"; to say that knowledge is in the mind or thoughts in the head, is to make "in" mean "inside." The latter use adheres to a basically Cartesian dualistic schema of inside/outside, which Charles Taylor calls the I/O epistemological "picture" (2005, 26) . He argues that although Cartesian dualism has, generally, been explicitly dismissed, it nevertheless persists in various modified forms: we often "find the [I/O] picture invoked within an argument that is meant to repudiate that very picture"; "a picture can hold us captive, even when we think we are escaping it" (ibid., 29, 30). 6 To truly move beyond Cartesian dualism requires a revised conception of the location of mindedness and a renewed appreciation of both the role of the body and the condition of embodiment in grounding the possibility of knowledge.
To see how such a revised conception fits with McDowell, we will turn briefly to Robert Pippin, who explains that the type of rationality to which McDowell is committed is not a "'situation-independent' notion of rational normativity, much less any claim that successful coping must be the result of explicit or even implicit rule-following." Rather, writes Pippin in terms that echo Taylor, McDowellian rationality "is 'in' action, not 'behind' action" (2013, 93) . "Conceptuality" is the condition of possibility of rational experience, for without it "we would have no basis for the kind of attentiveness and discrimination by virtue of which an experience of a single subject through time would be possible" (Pippin 2013, 98) . As suggested above, it is in the temporally grounded unity of embodied mindedness (or, indeed, minded embodiment) that a distinctly human subjectivity or agency emerges as such. Quotidian disruptions, of the broken-door-handles-type, are possible only on the basis of our apperceptively taking things to be thus and so, in the face of the possibility of our apperceptively revising such takings. Thus, where conceptuality does not entail detached self-monitoring, seeing-and-taking something to be that something, whether or not it ends up subject to revision, just "is the way we see; it is not a seeing also 'monitored' by a self-conscious I" (Pippin 2013, 101) .
McDowellian conceptuality is therefore relocated, from "in" the mind to the embodied person -conceived as an integrated whole and not as a mere sum-total of live functioning bodyparts 7 -because "[e]xperience is not guided by sensations; it is sensory awareness and can only be sensory awareness […] if it has the power of discrimination, a conceiving power actualized sensorily" (Pippin 2013, 102) . We might add a Heideggerian blue-note to this, by saying that experience is sensory awareness shot through with significance. On both the McDowellian and Dreyfusian models, then, mindedness is constitutive of and constituted by embodied persons, just as in Heidegger the worldhood of the world is constitutive of Dasein.
On the view being pressed here, mindedness is not constituted by internally "held" propositionally structured descriptions or pictures of the world (see Taylor, 2005 Taylor, & 2014 , but emerges from what Merleau-Ponty calls "the dialectic of milieu and action." 8 We see this in the deliberate, repeated actions of pre-verbal children, whose worldly engagements signify equipmental functions and test environmental affordances; 9 we see it in persons' tacit understandings of where-and-when they are, which knowledge grounds -even while, for the most part, it is not the focus of attention -their ability to go on effectively, as the situation requires. Such scenarios depict conceptual and, in a very real sense, knowledgeable copings. But although knowledge is always-already conceptual, this is not to say that it always has or needs a tongue. The pre-linguistic child's knowledge and our where-and-when-knowledge exemplify knowledge as conceptual without being, at base, propositional or linguistic. Propositionality is neither the ground of knowledge, nor is it synonymous with conceptuality. The embodied person is the ground of conceptuality, knowledge, and, further "up" the chain, as it were, propositionality. Dreyfus is mistaken in opposing fluid coping to conceptuality; but his work, like McDowell's, cautions against crude intellectualism and I/O-Cartesianism. Let us pursue this further by considering the issue of TK and language. §5: Articulability, Tellability, & Transmissibility A necessary condition of knowledge in Gascoigne and Thornton is that it must be, at least in principle, "transmissible"; this marks it as knowledge of something. They thus end their book with a brief consideration of the teaching and learning of TK. If transmissibility is a characteristic of knowledge, they claim, then knowledge must be at least partially expressible in linguistic form; there is, therefore, a positive connection between TK and language: "To grasp the meaning of a word is to have a potentially unlimited competence in it its use even if it is explicable […] in finite and particular explanations" (176).
Language alone, however, is not sufficient to transmit, share, or articulate fully the conceptual contents of TK. Language must be complemented by situated practical demonstration: 10 in this sense, remember, TK, for Gascoigne and Thornton, is tacit: in their terms, it can be situationally "articulated" but not "codified." Nevertheless, because TK is knowledge, there should in principle be nothing about it "hidden from view." Thus, in their chapter on TK and language (pp. 167-189), they end in neatly aphoristic fashion, invoking the spirit of Polanyi: "Although we know more than we can tell, we can articulate, and hence (in principle) transmit to others, all that we know" (189).
Although it is never explicated, there seems to be a crucial operative difference in Gascoigne and Thornton between "articulability" and "tellability," a difference close if not identical to that between "articulability" and "codifiability." "Tellability" and "codifiability" rely on words alone (hence, their context-independence): all that one needs to know can be captured or given linguistically, in propositional form. "Articulability," by contrast, indicates modes of knowing that are, in a sense, multi-modal: to demonstrate that this is the way to kick a ball from the mid-way line into that goal in these conditions on this pitch requires both linguistic and paralinguistic performance. "Articulation," then, suggests both linguistic expression and the coordination and integration of different communicative modes, the locus and ground of which is the embodied person who is in a particular style of relationship with their surroundings: TK seems to involve skilled practical performances that are date-, time-, place-, and situationstamped.
The difference between codifiability and articulability, however, may be little more than that between an impossible ideal and a basic reality. A true proposition might have the character of what Quine calls an "eternal sentence" (1960, 12-13; 1992, 77-79) , and yet circumstances -context -might not be propitious for its utterance. But more important to our current discussion: to understand the tacitness as inhering in situation-specificity is to miss an important point about knowledge generally: knowledge is expressed only as conditioned or solicited response. As Taylor says, in terms Pippin echoes, "understanding and know-how [...] [are] not 'within' me in a kind of picture"; they are "in the interaction" (2005, 38). The proposition "1+1=2" cannot be demonstrated free of some determinate context, even if it turns out to be true in every context in which it is uttered. For many, its truth is accepted based on testimony 11 and demonstration, and is seldom questioned, so familiar does it become. But how far can I get in saying how it is that I know this to be context-independently true? Not very. Could I, however, I would require a setting conducive to the demonstration of my rich specialist knowledge, just as demonstration of bike-riding requires an appropriate mise en scène. Moreover, there may be contexts in which the codifiability of a proposition is challenged without my belief in its general applicability being shaken.
There is, then, no "explicit" knowledge that is genuinely context-independent, therefore absolutely codifiable. There are simply propositions the truth of which we are seldom led to question. Thus, "1+1=2" satisfies Gascoigne and Thornton's criteria for TK, which is surely not what they intend. If knowledge is always fundamentally situation-specific, then it must always be interlaced with something else we can point to and call "tacit," otherwise the distinction between tacit and other types or modes of knowing disappears. §6: The Non-Linguistic Structure of TK In the wake of these observations, I suggest, first, that knowledge, far from rendering worldhood meaningless, emerges as a function of worldhood, and, second, that TK need not be linguistic, primarily or even at all, though it is conceptual and significant.
Take the expert-practitioner and her expert-teacher. On Gascoigne and Thornton's account, the expert footballer can be said to possess TK proper, because her knowledge can be articulated performance-practically and demonstrative-propositionally (in, goal-scoring accompanied by demonstrative utterances of the sort, "this is how you do it"). The type of practical knowledge possessed and demonstrated by this expert is both, in terms that Gascoigne and Thornton borrow from Harry Collins, "contributory" and "interactional": 12 contributory, because the footballer's skill allows her to participate in the game itself; interactional, because she possess also the ability to vocalize part of what it is to skilfully kick a ball, and therefore an ability, in principle, to teach or transmit that ability.
However, the ability to say of one's own performance "this is how you do it," is of the detached self-monitoring mode of conceptuality. Clearly, there are many situations in which we do have this self-monitoring capacity; but it is not, in either McDowell or Dreyfus, primarily or originarily constitutive of knowledge. I would add: nor is it characteristic of TK. Minddetachment, on Gascoigne and Thornton's account, appears to be written into a theory of TK that relies in part on McDowell, even as it seems to be a basic McDowellian principle that such mind-detachment is not a primary or enabling condition of experience or knowledge. What, then, has gone wrong?
Whether intended or not, Gascoigne and Thornton elide propositionality and conceptuality by synonymizing "conceptually structured" knowledge -understood on McDowell's model -and "conceptual knowledge" -which appears to be knowledge of languagegame-specific propositions, as we are told that one can have "relevant practical knowledge without having practical knowledge" (183). The mistake is clear: by keeping propositionality and conceptuality separate, we can make good McDowell's charge -exemplified above by prelinguistic conceptuality and knowledge-where-and-when -that "the question 'how the nonconceptual given is converted into a given with conceptual content' [....] should be rejected, not answered." 13 Collapsing conceptuality and propositionality resuscitates that bad question by implicitly endorsing the view that there is something "behind" action -the propositions that supposedly encode it -whereas, pace Pippin and Taylor, there is no need for any such hypostatization: conceptuality is not "behind" action, in the way that meaning is sometimes said to be "in" or "behind" words, or propositionality "behind" sentences and sentence utterances; conceptuality-as-embodied-sensory-awareness is in action.
Consider the difference between the following sentences: (i) "That is the same shade of x as…"; (ii) "This is how you kick a ball." (i) does not require any self-monitoring of the sort that 11 On testimony and tacit knowledge, see . 12 Gascoigne & Thornton (179-83); Ross (2008) ; Collins (2004) , (2010); Collins & Evans (2007) . 13 McDowell (2007, 349) , qtd Gascoigne & Thornton (164).
McDowell and Dreyfus wish to avoid, while (ii) does, but only if we accept -which I think we should not -the ability to propositionally accompany one's skilled performances as characteristic of TK. Nevertheless, both sentences are tokens of what can properly be called TK.
(i) indexes knowledge-how of colour-and shade-identification and -sorting, pace McDowell. (ii), however, does not index skilled ball-kicking abilities, which can be enacted without the self-monitoring indicated by the vocal declarative accompaniment. For as Pippin identifies, embodied responses index sensory awareness as being in rather than behind action. Sentence (i) is one way of betokening TK of colour-and shade-distinctions; but this might also be enacted in non-verbal colour-sorting. This is not to say that language is not involved, or that linguistic involvements do not play a part. It is to say that language is not the skeleton or kernel of knowledge; rather, it is something that gets integrated with conceptual knowledge at a later stage. Sentence (ii), by contrast, is an adjunct to the knowledge supposedly being enacted. It is not necessary in order to demonstrate the conceptual knowledge of skilled ball-kicking; but it is a necessary mark of another domain of know-how: knowing-how to put into words one's knowhow.
We do not get to the core of a capacity by being able to render linguistically what, why, and how one does what one does. If a teacher can demonstrate, linguistically and paralinguistically, how one Fs, so that knowledge is successfully shared, then what is being instantiated is the teacher's practical skill or know-how of the teaching of that activity or action (or, perhaps, the range of these constitutive of a particular language-game). Perhaps the expert music student and the expert music teacher are bound by a language-game in common; but language-games can involve different practices -including musical-performance and instrumental-teaching -and these student and teacher do not necessarily have in common, at least not in the space of the teaching studio (for who is to say that the teacher might not also be a performer?).
I am disputing neither that TK is articulable, conceptually structured, or "visible"; nor that one can be both aware of one's ability to consistently and deliberately F at will, and able to describe how one Fs. What cannot be linguistically captured is the how of the how-of-things, and it is here that the tacit dimension is to be located. One can know that one can perform a certain task and can enact that knowledge by volitionally doing so on different occasions (this is the temporal persistence that McDowell claims is necessary to pervasive conceptuality). But the capacity to put-into-language cannot, at the risk of regress, be itself linguistic, in the sense of a capacity that is propositionally structured at its "core." Vocalization need not be accompanied by propositionally structured, third-person self-monitorings -which would amount to what: parallel "internal vocalizations"? -just as skilled goal-scoring and acrobatic manoeuvring need not be propositionally paralleled. The teacher may be able to articulate effectively how one Fs. But how many times can he answer questions as to how it is that he can so articulate how one Fs?
Saying how one Fs might, as McDowell notes, block the F-ing, but one does not separately monitor one's ability to answer as one answers. Being able to say "This is how you do it" does not undergird the conceptual nature of the practical ability. Once again: the conceptual nature of the ability is in, not behind, the executed action. The ability to say points to a different practical ability: the ability to express linguistically how one Fs. One does not self-reflexively "say" "inwardly" how it is that one is talking well at the moment one is indeed talking well, just as one does not self-reflexively "say," either "inwardly" or "outwardly," how it is that one is kicking a ball as one kicks a ball. It is wrong to think of the expert gymnastics pundit as having only interactional expertise in relation to gymnastics, when they may have contributory expertise in relation to gymnastics-punditry (analysis, narration, diagnosis, and so on, of gymnastic performance).
To McDowell's point that the flow of action must be broken when one puts into words what one is doing, let us add that when one stream of flow is interrupted -that of fluid vegetable dicing on the chopping board, say -another stream takes over -for example, a stream of vocalizing capacity. Thinking in terms of different streams of flow and different practical capabilities avoids the pitfall of regress that Gascoigne and Thornton so carefully investigate and critique, but risk reproducing by hypostasizing knowledge with conceptuality and then collapsing conceptuality and propositionality. No amount of situation-specific contextualizing solves this, so long as action and vocalization are taken as binarily opposed aspects of the same know-how, on the familiar model of the theory/practice (or interactional/contributory) opposition. If knowledge is thought to come from "within" and to be propositionally structured, then we find ourselves in the very I/O picture we thought we had escaped. But if one sees acts of vocalization as embodied and bodily, then vocal and non-vocal acts can be understood as different in degree but not in kind: reciting a line or two of verse is not the same as clicking one's fingers, yet both are deliberate, embodied, bodily, practical; and while we might be able to say how one goes through the motions of such acts, yet we cannot get all that far in saying how it is that we can say how we know how we can go through such motions. §7: Coda This article has taken the shape of a close critical reading of Gascoigne and Thornton's work on TK, which, as I mentioned in the introduction, has a great deal to recommend it. However, I have attempted to tease out two problems -their dismissal of worldhood, and their residual I/OCartesianism -in order to reformulate a definition of TK as practical knowledge that is not in and of itself propositionally structured, for it is not "in" the mind in the way a thought is casually said to be "in" one's head. In this sense, it is tacit, for the know-how itself does not have nor does it need a tongue. However, an ability A still counts as knowledge of something, and is comprehendible as such, because persistently and repeatedly we see that knowledge enacted significantly. My claim is that there is no knowledge that is not context-dependent, and therefore no knowledge that is not practical. I have sought to give body back to text, by seeing the ability to verbalize one's capacity for F-ing as embodied and therefore practical, rather than theoretical, for to theorize is certainly to do something. I have thus sought to weaken the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge.
It yet remains to link the foregoing discussion to educational matters. By way of conclusion, then, I will briefly outline some issues of education and TK worthy of further consideration.
(1) Let us first review not what TK brings to philosophy of education, but what education might bring to philosophy of TK. While they end by considering the transmission of TK, Gascoigne and Thornton do not consider the dynamics of teaching and learning adequately. Given their insistence on context-dependency and practice, it is strange that due consideration is not given to the everyday contexts and practices of teaching-and-learning. The landscapes, Backgrounds, worldhoods -call them what you will -of teaching-and-learning are constitutive not only of whether one learns, but directly of what is learned and in what way or style. Students and teachers might operate in common milieux without being in common world(hood)s. The disclosed significances of the workshop, for example, are the same neither for novice, intermediate, and expert student, nor for them and expert teacher .
(2) By loosening the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, I have tried to offer a carefully qualified yet general model of what teachers' practical knowledge consists and in what it inheres. That teachers do possess some form or forms of practical knowledge, that they are phronimoi, should not be in doubt. But the implications of the foregoing are that teachers' practical wisdom (their comportment in the classroom, say) and their so-called "subject-knowledge" cannot be separated, and should not be thought as divisible along the axes of practice and theory, interaction and contribution. If knowledge is in interaction -in, as Merleau-Ponty has it, "the dialectic of milieu and action" -and if conceptuality runs all the way through what there is in being-human, then, in the milieu of the classroom, subject-area and subject-knowledge emerge discursively and dialectically -interactionally -and not as the residue of "the teaching of knowledge" building-block fashion. Contra Hirsch, Christodoulou (2014) and other prominent spokespersons, "knowledge" taught amounts not to the "fundamentals" of a subject. Rather, the teacher is in the position of critic and diagnostician, drawing to attention this or that detail, in the way one might regard a detail excerpted from larger painting. As Aldridge formulates it, subject-matter proper is disclosed in the three-fold dialectic of teacher, student, and text (the so-called "contents" of a lesson or lessons). 14 Thus, it is less important to formal schooling that knowledge be transmitted than that it be shared via a common milieu: one does not learn how to score goals until one has a more general, even if rudimentary, grasp of the language-game of football. 15 (3) Just as the stance I have taken does not recognize the theory/practice distinction in the teacher's activities, neither does it recognize that distinction as it is so often read into the infelicitously termed "academic" and "vocational" subjects. There are no forms of knowledge or knowing that are not practical; but there are different practical domains of learning -"languagegames" will do fine -in which situations elicit various more or less appropriate responses. The account developed herein thus draws TK out of the sole purview of vocational education.
(4) Finally, TK is not "flow": it is not equivalent to Dreyfusian fluid coping, whether or not we add to that notion McDowell's conceptual corrective. I will end with the example of so-called "creative writing" practices in English studies. For brevity's sake, let us distinguish between writing-practice -the development and exercise of authorial craft -and record-keepingwriting as place-holder for vocal response (whether in the form of a shopping list, questionnaire, multiple-choice test, and so on).
One does not learn writing-practice until one has grasped the notion of writing -as practiced by writers -as being different in its ontological accent, as it were, to record-keeping. Writing-practice involves a different comportment towards the activity of writing and one's relationship with the language that one both speaks and is spoken by 16 than does recordkeeping. A non-writer may be prone to far greater accuracy than a writer in their first-draft executions of standard written English; and yet this does not make them a writer. (These adumbrations still do not quite capture the difference I am getting at, for the difference is not one that can be fully captured propositionally, though it can be enacted.) Nor does writing "in flow" necessarily designate expertise. As I have argued, when stream of flow stops, another crosses over; focal attention is a network of shifting crosscurrents and connected tributaries. Were all streams to become dammed one would feel truly at a loss, for one would not know any longer how to go on. But the writer's expertise cannot be said to reside in their ability to continue writing in flow; affirmation of her expertise is countersigned, in part, by the whole work itself.
In closing, then, I suggest, in a spirit close to Gert Biesta's in recent work on emancipatory education, 17 that coming to know what one knows injects itself not during the continuum of "flow," but at and as the point of disruption.
